The Independent Internationalists

The Diplomatic Crossroad starts with a dramatic turn of events that sees a French plane crash-land. The pilot remains unscathed – doesn’t die – but the crash highlights Roosevelt’s covert collusion with the French to prepare them for a war that they can see coming fast round the corner. As usual, the authors highlight some key points that merit consideration – such as FDR wanted to revise US Neutrality laws to permit sale of arms and munitions to belligerents, etc…and most importantly, how the crash of the plane had adverse consequences on the President’s plans. The rumours that he wanted to push America’s frontier to the Rhine did not help much either.

According to the authors, the crashing of the plane is significant, because it highlights some “salient themes of interwar diplomacy”(134). Furthermore, the authors contend, it demonstrates the extent to which on the eve of World War II, the US govt sought “methods short of war to deter potential aggressors”(ibid). They argue that despite the fact that it may have failed, “it shows how an activist president can use subterfuge and surrogates to circumvent bureaucratic rivalries and congressional opposition”(ibid.).

Despite what any one may say, the US govt truly felt that they had to play an active role in world affairs, and if that meant going all gung-ho, then that was what they were going to do. At this point, we must not forget what Dr.Palo reminded us in class regarding US’s status – it was not ready to pursue a so-called isolationist policy where, ostrich-like, it would be deaf and dumb to outside events. However, as always, it appears some inward-looking subordinates of FDR felt this way – viz: subsequent Presidents, such as Coolidge and Hoover, as well as a scattering of bureaucrats under FDR.

Furthermore, we are reminded of the first oral speech – by Marit – in which she broached the subject of Wilson’s idealism and subsequent independent internationalism, meaning as the authors explain in greater depth on page 135: “active on an international scale, but independent in action”. If the US was not moving haltingly – as in Asia – it was moving vigorously, the authors contend.

That said, it would be wrong to argue that at no stage did America pursue isolationism. If we are to take Patterson et al’s word, then there are three main reasons why America remained isolationist during the wars:

i. isolate itself from war

ii. scale down foreign military interventions

iii. preserve freedom to make independent decisions in International Affairs in order to serve national interest of prosperity and security.

Until 1933, the book tells us, the Republican administrations worked assiduously towards certain objectives:

i. contain but rehabilitate Germany

ii. relieve French anxieties

iii. tame Soviet radicalism while seeking to integrate Russia into the community of nations

iv. advance disarmament proposals

v. resolve controversies over war debts and reparations

vi. stabilize European currencies

vii. foster US exports

viii. systematize flow of private US capital abroad

Moreover, what of US policy in the 1920s? Patterson et al argue that it was characterized by “weak presidential leadership, congressional-executive competition, and { -- on the upside --} increased professionalism in the Foreign Service -- something that I will be discussing later on. Before I do that however, it is imperative that we discuss the issue of the former Presidents, particularly Coolidge and Hoover.

Calvin Coolidge apparently knew very little about foreign policy although as a politician, the book writes, "{he} waxed noisy on the issue of bolshevism"(136). Physically, he was ostensibly "much like a wooden Indian except more tired looking"(ibid). He had a fawning worship of US business, but was unfortunately neither very dynamic nor active.

Herbert Hoover, unfortunately, was not that very different in the sense that he espoused a similar philosophy, though he had "considerable knowledge about foreign affairs and adopted an active presidential role"(ibid). He apparently practised the so-called independent internationalism that has been much talked about. His sobriquet (knickname) was "the Great Engineer" by virtue of the fact that he, unlike many other Presidents, had a phone installed at his elbow {a bit painful, no? ;-) } in the White House, "further contributing to his reputation as a specialist of administrative efficiency"(ibid).

The Secretaries of State in the 1920s are listed on p.137, but I will skip this, because I don't think it is of such high import in understanding. It may only really be important in understanding the context, but -- don't take my word for it -- go check that out :-) . Main thing to remember, I guess, is that Stimson was a major hawk in his dealings with foreign powers. For instance, the Stimson Doctrine, which I think exemplifies his position here.

The authors write that this type of strong personality was something the FDR particularly disliked, especially for a secretary of state. Why was this? Well, the fact that FDR was a bit of an idealist, preferring to sing the praises of Wilsonian diplomacy, as well as invoke his rhetoric, is paramount in understanding the mindset/psychology of this leader. The authors provide some insight into FDR's character and background on p.138. Most importantly, we get to find out about the frustration FDR often felt about diplomacy, thus leading him to try to conduct meetings on his own steam, rather than constantly consulting with his subordinates.

As for Hull, FDR's Tennessean secretary of state, he was apparently a bit more dynamic, wanting to focus his attention on international trade. His appointment was really merely for political reasons -- it would appease Democratic Party members, "southern conservatives, and unreconstructed Wilsonians"(ibid).

Simply put, whereas Roosevelt epitomized independent internationalism, Hull -- or better known under the more derogatory sobriquet of 'Miss Cordelia Dull' -- had an undynamic style, which did not impress either Roosevelt or the electorate.

The Foreign Service and its Professionalization

The Foreign Service had, for a long time, been the preserve of the rich and aristocratic. After the Rogers Act of 1924 however, some major changes went underway.

First of all, the two shells of the "unequal" Consular and the Diplomatic Corps fused together or -- in this age of mergers -- merged to become the US Foreign Service. It provided for examinations, "increased salaries, promotion by merit, and overseas living expense allowances"(139). This piece of legislation was also to create a Foreign Service School, whereby a greater level of professionalization and efficiency became the order of the day. George F Kennan, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, was one of the people to spearhead this radical change.

Economic and Cultural Expansion in a Rickety World

With the Foreign Service above board, the US was becoming the most powerful nation in the world, “accounting for 70% of the world’s petroleum and 40% of its coal production”(140). In short, the US was beating Great Britain in terms of industrial capacity by far. It was simply way out there à somewhere. The US was slowly becoming the hegemon, consolidating its power through industry, et al.

Basically, the US economy was in a process of a fantastic boom -- with more and more US companies:

i. going to more countries

ii. building more plants in a particular foreign country

iii. manufacturing or mining more end products

iv. investing in one nation a greater degree of integration

v. diversifying on a worldwide basis

Simply put, the US culture and industry was increasingly becoming ubiquitous, and the phrase that perhaps best exemplifies this idea is that by Scott Fitzgerald who declared that “we will be the Romans in the next generation”(140).

However, this so-called “economic-cultural activity faced obstacles”, such as:

n Mexican nationalism

n Confiscation of property in Russia

n European resentments

n A wrecked German economy

n Wartime destruction in Europe

n Growing tariff walls

n The dislocation of international finance caused by WW1 debts & reparations

The US government subsequently offered help, albeit limited:

a. The Webb-Pomerene Act (1918)

b. Edge Act of 1919

c. Merchant Marine Act of 1920

It must be noted here that the US government continued to pursue its policy of the Open Door – NB: it is the pursuit of this that got them entangled in the Manchurian Crisis of 1931. Looking through this chapter however, it remains clear that their policy was selective and imperfect, as the authors argue. Please check p.142 for more info J

Although the US was steadily growing, it must equally be noted that the 1929 depression most inevitably had an adverse consequence on the US economy, given that the US was the main springboard of economic liberalism. There are some stats that the authors provide on p.143, but it seems clear that nothing has changed much since the 1920s. There were potential tarriff wars – c.f. WTO against ACP-EU Banana Policies from 1998-99 – that all died down eventually once the depression set in big time.

The year 1934 was a great year for Hull, because it was in this year that he “piloted through Congress the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act”. It’s objective was to empower the President to reduce tarriffs by as much as 50 percent after making agreements with other nations under the doctrine of the most-favoured nation” (143).

Hull also created in this same year the Export-Import Bank, a governmental agency “designed to provide loans to expand foreign trade”. Unfortunately, it appears such programs came way too late to resolve the reparations problem. However, it’s main significance is that it radically transformed the US from a debtor nation to a creditor nation overnight.

In 1924, Charles G. Dawes negotiated the Dawes Plan, which would help relive the Germans and their reparations. The Young Plan of 1929 later followed. Unfortunately, the Depression set in not soon after. In 1931, Hoover declared “a one-year moratorium on debts payments. But thereafter only Finland met its debt obligations, forever winning a place in American hearts”(144).

PEACE INITIATIVES BLUNTED

In 1928, Kellog-Briand Pact was signed, where war was to be abolished as an instrument of national policy. Many peace activists went hammer-and-tong behind this, hoping that peace would be the order of the day. It set a precedent, because it was the first time after the failure of the League that initiatives towards some peace and stability were discussed and formulated. Most important thing to note here is that Americans participated in disarmament conferences in 1922 (Washington); 1927 (Geneva); 1930 (London); 1932-33 (Geneva), and 1935-36 (London). (More on p.147)

COLD AS STEEL: SOVIET-AMERICAN ENCOUNTERS

Russians – they joined the Kellog-Briand Pact & joined the League in 1934. Unfortunately for them, the other powers pooh-poohed in their faces, preferring to ignore them because they did not want to be associated with the so-called ‘Bolshevik’ threat. Although Ramsey MacDonald – British Labour PM -- did recognise her in the early twenties, if there was any attempt at some communication, it was done “grudgingly” – as the United States purportedly did.

Apparently, there was this HUGE communication and cultural gap between the Russians and the Americans, with many Americans warning off the Russians. Reportedly, so hostile were the feelings that Stimson – you remember the hawk who came up with the doctrine @ the start of the Manchurian Crisis in 1931 – declared in 1930 that “there would be no recognition until Russia ‘ceased to agitate for the overthrow of American institutions by revolution’ ” (148).

Conversely, there were also those who were seeking a rapprochement with the Soviet Union. It comes as no surprise that by 1924, “Soviet purchases of American products had jumped seven times over the 1923 figure”(148). In 1929, Henry Ford’s contract with the S.U. “seemed remarkable”(148). Unfortunately, by the early 1930s, US-Soviet relations began to decline -- big time. In order to prevent any further expansionist aggression – or at least to contain it – FDR recognized the Soviet Union in 1933.

Simply put, the US govt were outraged by the “Nazi Soviet pact of August 1939”(151). To make matters worse, they apportioned blame to the Soviets for the Second World War because of Stalin’s horrendous and brutal purges.

HITLER’s GERMANY, APPEASEMENT, AND THE OUTBREAK OF WAR

Here, we can get the outline not only from Dr.Palo’s sheet, but also from other sources. I will BRIEFLY outline the main points. Before I do that however, it is necessary to mention how sufficiently open-minded the British were during the 1930s. I mean, come on, they were willing to tally on down with the Germans, by allowing them to rebuild their navy “to 35 percent of the size of the British navy”(152). The authors argue that “this proved a costly concession to German militarism”(ibid).

The authors then go on to write about the “flop”(Mussolini as described by Churchill in the video watched on Wednesday) and his invasion of Abyssinia, Ethiopia in October 1935. In March 1936, Hitler’s troops goose-stepped into the Rhineland, “the area bordering Belgium and France that the Versailles treaty had declared permanently demilitarized”(153). The British and the French govts did NOTHING, allowing to let all this happen whilst they sat with their hands between their laps. Hitler just lapped all this up and went in blind with ambition.

In what looks like a knee-jerk reaction, in October 1936, Germany and Italy got involved in what became known as the Rome-Berlin Axis, and a month later, Germany and Japan , “then subjugating China, joined in the Anti-Comintern Pact aimed @ Russia”(ibid). July 1936, the Spanish Civil War broke out. This involved Franco and his Nationalist soldiers against “Loyalist” Republican government.

Subsequently, Chamberlain was elected in mid-1937 as Br.PM, and was to enshrine what has become a derogatory term in the parlance of diplomatic history as the policy of “appeasement” {Jonathon, et al! You remember this from HIS-212, British History!!}.

In March 1938, “German troops crossed into Austria and annexed it to the German Reich”.(ibid) {I did my paper on this issue in Dr.Palo’s HIS-212 if more info needed ;-) } The Anschluss – or union – soon after took place, much to the annoyance of a wary Chamberlain and a slew of British diplomats, bent on avoiding a war like that of World War One. The main protagonists in this drama were Hitler, and an Austrian Nazi by the name of Seyss-Inquart.

After Chamberlain declared “peace in our time”, two particular events that were to have adverse consequences on world peace took place: Hitler’s invasion of Czechoslovakia and Mussolini’s invasion of Albania. Unfortunately, Poland was to come next -- NB, all these territorial conquests were a feathers in the dictators’ ‘caps’. On August 23, “Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia signed the non-aggression pact, essentially assuring Berlin that Russia would remain neutral and not align with an Anglo-French coalition”(154).Poland found herself caught between all this hubub, effectively divided between two powers. The slide to war is now all too inevitable...

ANALYSIS: That Hitler felt that the US government was a negligible power boggles the mind. Even if he did not understand the psychology that was driving the American nation -- liberalism and democratic principles -- he was arguably blinded by his racist and anti-semitic views. This, it seems, led him to fail to consider that the gargantuan (great, formidable) strength of the US was predicated not only on its multi-ethnic, albeit troubled, past but also its unprecedented economic strength.

AMERICAN ISOLATIONISM AND THE NEUTRALITY ACTS

FDR was to declare American a ‘neutral nation’ in his speech of September 3 1939, though he later added that he could not guarantee that Americans would remain neutral in thought as well. Patterson argues that the nation’s ‘nascent unneutrality’ came ‘late in the decade’(156). From the readings, it appears that US public opinion was ready to withdraw all its support from Europe, which it saw as burdensome.

The ghost of Wilson, if sleeping, was constantly forced to wake because the Americans incessantly invoked his past rhetoric, made comparisons between some of his policies and those of Roosevelt’s consequences, as well as indicated the extent to which he had been possibly lobbied by big business to go into war. Now, we, as humble students, know that the brainchild of the League of Nations was, despite everything, the Ultimate Pacifist -- but only with hindsight can we proffer such judgment. At the time, the US citizens believed strongly that having learned the lessons of World War One -- keep out of problematic Europe for it was a blunder -- it was high time to buckle up, sit tight and let the Europeans ‘over there’ fight it all out.

NB! Isolationists were inherently liberal reformers “who believed that American entry into a European war would undercut the New Deal’s attempts to recover from the depression”(157).

By 1937, 20 of the top 100 US corporations “had negotiated important agreements with Nazi Germany, some of them with the backbone of the German miltary machine”(157). This all happened in the wake of severe and vigorous criticism of US public opinion’s petulant[1] attitude over troublesome Europe.

The Neutrality Act of 1935 is highly significant, because it is this that required “an American arms embargo against all belligerents after the President had officially declared the existence of war”(158).Also, an amendment of 1937 made the US neutral in the Spanish Civil War.

Moreover, Patterson et al offer an indictment of the Neutrality Acts, claiming that “they denied the US any forceful word in the cascading events in Europe”(150). “However praiseworthy” they argue, “their formula for the 1930s proved as misguided as Britain’s appeasement policy”(158).

ROOSEVELT SHIFTS, CONGRESS BALKS ON EVE OF WAR

Despite the way in which the authors seemed to sing the praises of Roosevelt, they seem to conclude here that his policy was rather weak, because, essentially, it “fed appeasement”(158). They provide a succinct outline of the events that led to the descent into the European maelstrom on p.159. However, they also emphasize that there are two things that broke Roosevelt out of his shell of so-called isolationism: Japanese terror in China (1931) and dismemberment of Czechoslovakia (Munich Conference in 1938).

In that same year, Roosevelt asked Congress for $300 million for national defense. As was British public opinion Russophobic during the Crimean War of 1853-56, so were the Americans hoping that a strong Germany would act as a “bulwark against Soviet Russia”(160).

In the final analysis the author’s balance sheet of Roosevelt is pretty damning. They criticize him on the grounds that he failed to lead “at a critical time”(161). Even more significant is their conclusion of the chapter: “The interwar quest for world order and peace had failed; the several Neutrality Acts had failed; independent internationalism had failed”(161).

(c)ekbensah, 2000